The iterative nature of the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm presents a challenge for privacy-preserving estimation, as each iteration increases the amount of noise needed. We propose a practical private EM algorithm that overcomes this challenge using two innovations: (1) a novel moment perturbation formulation for differentially private EM (DP-EM), and (2) the use of two recently developed composition methods to bound the privacy "cost" of multiple EM iterations: the moments accountant (MA) and zero-mean concentrated differential privacy (zCDP). Both MA and zCDP bound the moment generating function of the privacy loss random variable and achieve a refined tail bound, which effectively decrease the amount of additive noise. We present empirical results showing the benefits of our approach, as well as similar performance between these two composition methods in the DP-EM setting for Gaussian mixture models. Our approach can be readily extended to many iterative learning algorithms, opening up various exciting future directions.
Introduction
Data on all aspects of our daily lives, such as behavioural, health and financial data, are increasingly collected, stored and analyzed by corporations and government agencies, and there is a dire need for developing machine learning tools that can analyze these data while still guaranteeing the privacy of individuals. Much progress has been made recently in developing privacy-preserving methods [1, 2] and differential pri- vacy, in particular, is emerging as the dominant notion of algorithmic privacy [1] .
In this paper, we derive differentially private variants of the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm which has been widely used to solve statistical problems in many areas of science including bioinformatics [3] , neuroscience [4] , and computer vision [5] . Expectation maximization iteratively estimates the parameters of models with unobserved variables. We present a very general privacy-preserving EM algorithm which can be used for any model with a complete-data likelihood in the exponential family. We then apply our algorithm to the mixture of Gaussians (MoG) density estimation model and the factor analysis (FA) model. Having access to a private density estimator is particularly valuable because it provides a means to anonymize the data in a principled way, by simply sampling a dataset from the model and replacing the original data with this sampled data.
Since differentially private machine learning algorithms usually achieve privacy by adding noise to perturb the output of the algorithm or its intermediate stages, the main challenge in developing privacypreserving algorithms is in controlling the associated loss in statistical efficiency or utility per sample. This problem is particularly exacerbated for iterative algorithms such as EM. For example, recent work on the k-means algorithm, a variant of EM for mixture of Gaussians, requires adding noise to the parameters where the noise standard deviation is on the order of the input dimension times the number of iterations [6] , which may necessitate early termination. To avoid this, more recent work proposes to apply a standard k-means clustering algorithm to a privatized synopsis of the data [7] . Their synopsis generation method consists of putting rectangular bounding boxes in the data space and counting how many data points are in each box. However, this method applies mainly to the clustering task and for low-dimensional data.
Instead, we propose to resolve the privacy-utility dilemma using two key innovations: a private EM formulation based on moment perturbation for sensible use of the privacy budget per iteration, and recently arXiv:1605.06995v2 [cs. LG] 31 Oct 2016
proposed composition methods to improve the privacy cost across many iterations. Our moment perturbation approach is applicable for any model in which the complete-data likelihood is in the exponential family. In such cases, the EM parameters are functions of moments of latent and observed variables, which we perturb for privacy. Moment perturbation for differentially private estimators is not a new concept (see [8, 9] ). However, unlike [9] , we do not require subsampling of the data.
Furthermore, our algorithm calculates the cumulative privacy cost using two refined composition methods, the moments accountant and zCDP. The moments accountant [10] bounds the moments of the privacy loss random variable. Inspired by CDP [11] , zCDP [12] formulates the moments of the privacy loss random variable in terms of the Rényi divergence between the output distributions obtained by running an algorithm on two datasets that differ in the value of a single individual. In both cases, the moments bound yields a tighter tail bound, and consequently, for a given total privacy budget, allows for a higher per-iteration budget than standard methods. Our experimental results show that by combining our moment perturbation formulation of privacy-preserving EM with refined composition methods, we obtain a practical and effective algorithm for privately estimating the parameters of latent variable models.
We start by reviewing differential privacy, the moments accountant, and EM in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we introduce our general DP-EM framework. We then derive the DP-EM algorithm for mixture of Gaussians in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we construct the MA and zCDP formulation for EM under MoGs. In Sec. 6, we provide the DP-EM algorithm for factor analysis, and we illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms in Sec. 7.
Background
In this section, we provide background information on the definitions of algorithmic privacy that we use, the MA and zCDP formulations which provide a refined privacy analysis, as well as the general EM algorithm.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis algorithms [1] . Given an algorithm M and datasets X, X differing by a single entry, the privacy loss random variable of an outcome o is
M is -DP if and only if |L (o) | ≤ , ∀o. Intuitively, the definition states that the output probabilities must not change very much when a single individual's data is modified, thereby limiting the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one individual. An approximate version is ( , δ)-DP, defined to hold if and only if |L (o) | ≤ , with probability at least 1 − δ.
Concentrated differential privacy. Concentrated differential privacy (CDP) is a recently proposed relaxation of differential privacy which aims to make privacy-preserving iterative algorithms more practical than for DP while still providing strong privacy guarantees. There are two variants of CDP. First, in (µ, τ )-
2 /2 , ∀λ ∈ R. Second, in τ -zCDP [12] , that arises from a connection between the moment generating function of L (o) and the Rényi divergence between the distributions of M (X) and that of M (X ) , we require:
is also subgaussian but zero-mean. In zCDP, composition is straightfoward since the Rényi divergence between two product distributions is simply the sum of the Rényi divergences of the marginals.
We will use zCDP rather than mCDP, since many DP and approximate DP mechanisms can be characterised in terms of zCDP, but not in terms of mCDP without a large loss in privacy parameters. This correspondence will allow us to use zCDP as a tool for analyzing composition under the ( , δ)-DP privacy definition, for a fair comparison between CDP and DP analyses.
1
Moments accountant. The moments accountant calculates a privacy budget by bounding the moments of L (o) , where the λ-th moment is defined as the log of the moment generating function evaluated at λ [10] :
The worst case over all the neighbouring databases
Using Markov's inequality, for any > 0, the λ-th moment is converted to the ( , δ)-DP guarantee by
The λ-th moment in Eq (2) composes linearly, which yields the composability theorem (Theorem 2.1 in [10] ). An immediate result from the composibility theorem is that the sum of each upper bound on α Mj is an upper bound on the total λth moment after J compositions,
The general EM algorithm.
, with each observation x i ∈ R d , and hidden variables Z :
, computing the maximum likelihood estimator of a vector of model parameters θ = [θ 1 , · · · , θ L ] is analytically intractable, due to the integral or summation inside the logarithm, L(θ) = log p(X|θ) = log dZ p(X, Z|θ).
Instead, one can lower-bound L(θ) using the posterior distribution over latent variables q(Z) [13] ,
where the lower bound is often called free energy [14] ,
, where H(q) is the entropy of q(Z). EM alternates between: (1) the E-step: optimizing F wrt distribution over unobserved variables holding parameters fixed
and (2) the M-step: maximizing F wrt parameters holding the latent distribution fixed
where
To understand what EM does, one can rewrite the free energy in terms of the log-likelihood and the KL divergence terms,
During the E-step, we set q (j) (Z) = p(Z|X, θ j−1 ), which makes the second term zero and the free energy equals the likelihood. Then, in the M-step, we get the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE). For the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate, we add the log prior for the parameters log p(θ) to the right hand side of Eq (8).
The general DP-EM algorithm
The EM algorithm is frequently used for models whose joint distribution over observed and unobserved variables remains in the exponential family: p(X, Z) = h(X, Z) exp(θ T (X, Z))/A(θ), while the marginal p(X) does not. In this case, the free energy can be rewritten as
where c is some constant wrt θ, and
In the E-step, we compute the expected sufficient statistics under q, i.e., T (X, Z) q(Z) . Then, in the M-step, we compute partial derivatives wrt each parameter,
Although it is not straightforward to derive a closedform expression for each parameter update due to the dependence on other parameters in A(θ), it is easy to see that each parameter update depends on each expected sufficient statistics, i.e., moments, denoted by
. So, to output privatized parameters, all we need is to perturb the moments to compensate any single data point's change. The sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics is given by
where the last line is due to the triangle inequality. The expectation over z can be rewritten as an inner product, and using Hölder's inequality:
As in many existing works (e.g., [15, 16] among many others), we also assume that datasets are pre-processed such that the L 2 norm of any x i is less than 1, meaning that any x i stays within a unit ball. Furthermore, we assume that q(Z) has a bounded support of Z denoted by Z. Under these assumptions, the sensitivity is given by
Using this sensitivity, we add noise to each moment and the perturbed moments are mapped by a model-specific deterministic function g to the vector of privatized parameters, given asθ
,··· ,L are perturbed moments. Using this general framework, we derive the differentially private EM algorithm for mixture of Gaussians and factor analysis in the following.
DPEM for mixture of Gaussians

EM for Mixture of Gaussians
We consider the mixture of Gaussians (MoG) model as a first example to derive the DP-EM algorithm. For K Gaussians and N data points X :
, the loglikelihood under MoG is given by log p(X|π, µ, We denote the parameters by θ :
. Introducing a binary vector of length K for each data point, z i ∈ R K , to represent the membership to which Gaussian each datapoint belongs, e.g., z i,k ∈ {0, 1} and 
The joint distribution over observed and unobserved variables, which is in the exponential family, is given by log p(X, Z|π, µ, Σ) =
In the Estep, we compute the responsibilities as δ z i,k =k q(Z) given the parameters from the previous iteration θ
and in the M-step, we update the parameters θ by
where 
In this paper we set hyperparameters to conventional values, e.g.
, rather than optimizing them, cf. [17] .
Before moving to the next section, we would like to motivate why it is important to construct a privacy preserving algorithm for MoG. In Fig. 1 , we show that if one runs the EM algorithm for the given dataset, an individual's information can be easily revealed by just looking at the EM parameters, while the noised-up parameters obtained by the method, which will be described next, protect private information effectively. 
DPEM for MoG
Under MoG, we plug in the responsibilities given in Eq (11) to the parameter update expressions given in Eq (12). We then perturb each of these by taking into account one datapoint's worst-case difference between two neighboring datasets. We use i to denote a privacy budget allocated per iteration.
i -DP or ( i , δ i )-DP mixing coefficients. For two neighbouring datasets with a single data point difference, the maximum difference in π occurs when the data point x j is assigned to the k-th Gaussian with γ j,k = 1 and the altered data point x j is assigned to another, e.g., the k -th Gaussian, with γ j,k = 1. Hence, we get the following sensitivity:
since 0 ≤ γ j,k ≤ 1 and K k=1 γ j,k = 1. We add noise to compensate the maximum difference
, we do not need any additional sensitivity analysis, since the MAP estimate is a deterministic mapping of the MLE.
i -DP or ( i , δ i )-DP mean parameters. Using the noised-upÑ k obtained from the noised-up mixing coefficients, i.e.,Ñ k = Nπ k , the maximum difference in mean parameters due to one datapoint's difference is
,i =j γ i,k x i and the L1 term is bounded by Eq (10). The √ d term is from the fact that each input vector is L2-norm bounded by 1. 6 We add noise to the MLE via
( i , δ i )-DP covariance parameters. For covariance perturbation, we follow the Analyze Gauss (AG) algorithm [18] , which provides ( i , δ i )-DP. We first draw Gaussian random variables
5 To ensureπ
Then, we re-normalizẽ π M LE after the projection to ensure
The MAP estimate only differs from the MLE in the denominator. Hence, we simply replaceÑ k withÑ k + κ0 in Eq (15) in the MAP estimation case.
where β = 2 log(1.25/δ i )(∆Σ
2 and the sensitivity of the covariance matrix 8 in Frobenius norm is given by
. Using z, we construct a upper triangular matrix (including diagonal), then copy the upper part to the lower part so that the resulting matrix Z becomes symmetric. Then, we add this noisy matrix to the covariance matrix
The perturbed covariance might not be positive definite. In such case, we project the negative eigenvalues to some value near zero to maintain positive definiteness of the covariance matrix.
Combinations of the perturbations. Among all the possible combinations of these parameter perturbation mechanisms, we focus on two scenarios. Scenario 1 (which we call LLG) uses the i -DP Laplace mechanism for perturbing mixing coefficients (once) and mean parameters (K times) and the ( i , δ i )-DP Gaussian mechanism for perturbing the covariance parameters (K times). Since there are K Gaussians, for J iterations, there will be J(K+1) compositions of i -DP mechanism and JK compositions of ( i , δ i )-DP mechanisms in total in this scenario. Scenario 2 (which we call GGG) uses the ( i , δ i )-DP Gaussian mechanism for perturbing all the parameters. For J iterations, there will be J(2K + 1) compositions of ( i , δ i )-DP mechanism in total in this scenario.
Compositions for DP-EM for MoGs
Before describing our method, we first describe the two baseline methods. Our method calculates the per-iteration budget using the two composition methods below.
zCDP composition (zCDP). z-CDP composition yields (ρ + 2 ρ log(1/δ), δ)-DP, where
under scenario LLG and
under scenario GGG, for sensitivity ∆π, ∆µ k , ∆Σ k and σ 2 1 Moments Accountant composition (MA). For using MA, as a first step, we identify the form of privacy loss random variable and its λ-th moment in each mechanism we use.
at o = f (D) + x has the following form:
Following the definition in Eq (2), the λ-th moment is given by
. The λ-th moment is then
Note that multi-dimensional Laplace/Gaussian mechanisms also have the same form of the λ-th moment as the scalar version. See the Supplementary material for the derivation.
For achieving ( , δ)-DP, the tail bound is given by Compute parameters by plugging in the responsibilities given in Eq (11).
Noise up π by Eq (14), µ by Eq (16), and Σ by Eq (19).
DPEM for Factor Analysis
Under FA, the conditional distributions over observed variables x i are assumed to be Gaussian, p(x i |z i ) = N (x i |W z i , Ψ), and the prior over latent variables z i is also assumed to be Gaussian: p(z i ) = N (z i |0, I).
In this case, the complete-data likelihood is proportional to p(X, Z) ∝ exp(φ(θ) T (X, Z)), where φ(θ) is a vectorized version of the concatenated ma-
, and where the sufficient statistics are also a vectorized version of a concatenated matrix
Due to conjugacy the posterior over z i is also Gaussian, where the first and second moments are given byz i = GW Ψ −1 x i and z i z i = G +z izi . The expected sufficient statistics become a function of the data second moment matrix, denoted by Λ :
For privacy-preserving EM, we perturb Λ by Analyze Gauss [18] , resulting in a perturbed matrixΛ, which we use when updating the parameters by
until convergence, at no extra privacy cost. Therefore, unlike MoGs, FA only requires perturbing the data second moment matrix once for privacy preservation. The EM iterations are then post-processing steps which are free from cumulative differential privacy loss.
Experiments
We used four real-world datasets to test our algorithm.
In all datasets, we preprocessed the data such that the input vectors had maximum norm 1.
Stroke dataset was used in [19] for predicting the occurrence of a stroke within a year after an atrial fibrillation diagnosis. We used 100 principal components (d = 100) of 4, 096 raw features (conditions and medicines) recorded from 50, 345 patients, by assuming that the private database was given in this form. We divided the extracted dataset into 10 different pairs of training (90%) and test sets (10%), and reported the average test log-likelihood per datapoint across the 10 independent trials in Fig. 2 , setting k = 10.
Overall, the GGG scenario yielded higher test loglikelihoods than the LLG scenario, so we focused on this method in our experiments. We found that using the zCDP and MA compositions resulted in more accurate estimates, while also requiring less privacy budget, compared to other compositions. zCDP performed better than MA with a small privacy budget , but they both performed similarly well with a larger budget. The difference with small may be due to only searching over integer values of λ for MA, which we do for computational reasons, following [10] .
Life Science dataset is from the UCI repository [20] . The dataset contains 26,733 records, consisting of 10 principal components from chemistry and biology experiments (d = 10). Following other approaches (e.g., [21] ), we set k = 3. We divided the dataset into 10 different pairs of training (90%) and test sets (10%), and reported the average test log-likelihood per data point across the 10 independent trials in Fig. 3 . In this experiment, we focused on scenario GGG. Using the zCDP and MA compositions once again resulted in more accurate estimates while requiring less privacy budget than linear and advanced compositions.
Gowalla dataset contains the social network's users' check-in locations in terms of longitude and latitude (d = 2). The total number of data points is 1,256,384, which we divided into 10 cross-validation sets. We then performed k-means clustering and compared our method to a differentially private k-means clustering algorithm, DPLloyd [6] . The standard Lloyd algorithm for k-means clustering first partitions the data into k clusters, with each point assigned to be in the (6) -exp (4) -exp (2) exp (0) exp (2) exp (4) exp (6) nonprivate-EM Lin (LLG) Lin (GGG) Adv (LLG) Adv (GGG) zCDP (LLG) zCDP (GGG) MA (LLG) MA (GGG) cumulative privacy loss Test log-likelihood per datapoint Figure 2 : Stroke dataset. Test log-likelihood per data point as a function of cumulative privacy loss after 20 EM iterations. We fit the data with MoG using the conventional EM first (in black dotted line). We then ran the private EM algorithm with a different per-iteration privacy budget resulting from different composition methods, in order to achieve ( , δ)-DP EM parameters, where varies from 0.1 to 4 and δ is fixed to 10 −4 . We fixed δi = 10
when using Gaussian mechanisms.
same cluster as the nearest centroid, and then updates each centroid to be the center of the data points in the cluster. As summarized in [7] , the DPLloyd adds noise to the updated centroids. Specifically, the Laplace noise is added to the number of data points assigned to each cluster as well as to the sum of each coordinate of the data points assigned to each cluster. Hence, the sensitivity becomes d + 1. In the original DPLloyd algorithm, due to the conventional composition theorem for DP, their noise distribution follows Lap((d + 1)J/ ) for J iterations. We also tested the DPLloyd algorithm with zCDP compositions, which resulted in better performance in terms of normalized intra-cluster variance (NICV) across the 10 test sets. Our algorithm for k-means clustering also perturbs the centroids by adding the Laplace noise with zCDP composition, where the sensitivity of the mean locations is given in Eq (15). We set = 0.01 and δ = 10
for both algorithms. As shown in Fig. 4 , our method achieves smaller NICV than DPLloyd, even with a very small value of .
Olivetti Faces dataset is used to illustrate our private factor analysis method 9 . The dataset consists of ten different images for each of 40 distinct subjects (N = 400), where each image is 64 by 64, resulting in 4096 features (d = 4096). Each pixel is a floating point value on the interval [0, 1]. Each image was treated as a datapoint, rather than each subject, though this could readily be done via group privacy [1] . We set the la- tent dimension to 10. We tested non-private EM, DP-EM with = 0.2 and = 0.3 (fixing δ = 10 −4 ), and showed each column of the estimated loading matrix W in Fig. 5 . With = 0.2 (bottom) the components were noisy, but with = 0.3 (middle) the FA components' faces were nearly as recognizable as for the non-private FA algorithm (top), thereby accurately recovering a set of typical faces in the dataset.
Conclusion
We have developed a practical algorithm that outputs accurate and privatized EM parameters based on moment perturbation under the MA and zCDP composition analyses, which effectively decrease the amount of additive noise for the same expected privacy guarantee compared to the standard analysis. We illustrated the effectiveness of our algorithm on four datasets. Based on our results, we recommend the use of zCDP composition analysis for EM, since it performed better than MA in some regimes and is easier to compute. Furthermore, we found that the GGG combination performed better than LLG under these composition methods in the context of EM, which perhaps makes sense since the zCDP and MA compositions are tailored to the Gaussian mechanism.
The private EM algorithms for the mixture of Gaussians and factor analysis models we discussed in this paper are clearly only two examples of a much broader class of models to which our private EM framework applies. Our positive empirical results with EM strongly suggest that these ideas are likely to be beneficial for privatizing many other iterative machine learning algorithms. In future work, we plan to apply this general framework to other inference methods. This fits our broader vision that practical privacy preserving machine learning algorithms will have an increasingly relevant role to play in our field. Figure 3 : Life Science dataset Test log-likelihood per data point as a function of cumulative privacy loss after 10 EM iterations. We fit the data with MoG using the conventional EM first (in black dotted line). We then ran the DP-EM algorithm (GGG combination) with a different per-iteration privacy budget resulting from different composition methods, in order to achieve ( , δ)-DP EM parameters, where varies from 0.1 to 4 and δ is fixed to 10 −4 . We fixed δi = 10 −8 .
